For the V-force to be effective, it had to be armed and airborne before a Soviet strike could destroy it on the ground. This required defence of the V-force bases, their dispersal airfields and weapon stores, and readiness of the bombers, weapons, and crews.

Fighter Command’s capability and availability to intercept attacking Soviet bombers before they were able to attack the V-force on the ground.

The Soviet and home-grown threats to the bases and their aircraft and weapons. The developing capability of Soviet bomber and missile forces will be analysed, as will more local risks including the potential for sabotage.

The following will be described and analysed:

Airborne and ground-based early warning radar development.

Reaction to threats: command and control; quick reaction alert (QRA).

The development of interceptors, their weapons, and their capability.

The availability of interceptors and weapons.

The end of anti-aircraft artillery as a means of defence

The development and deployment of surface-to-air missiles.

The impact of the developing electronic counter-measures on both sides.

Active and passive local defence of the bases themselves, and of their nuclear weapons.

Getting the V-force airborne in the event of a Soviet attack.

Much changed, for example in terms of weapon technology, international relations, and threat level, during the period studied here. The lecture will present an overview of the period, and highlight periods of crisis.

Britain’s V-force: the early years